The partition of Ireland appears so obviously as a direct application of that policy,that most people in Ireland take it for granted that partition was deliberately devised by English politicans as a means of retaining a grip on Irish territory which at any time could be expanded.
However,the difficulty remained that Ulster Protestants,by overwhelming majorities at election after election,rejected candidates who favoured a united Ireland. As the 1950s wore on,some nationalists were beginning to wonder if their traditional assumptions were adequate to account for so adamant a resistance. A veteran Irish nationalist,Ernest Blythe,published numerous articles in English and Irish,and a book in Irish, Briseadh na Teorann ('The Smashing of the Border') in which he argured that partition existed,not because of the British,but because of the northern Protestants,and that the only way to bring about a united reland was by enticing sufficent northern Protestants to vote for it. Page 119

In 1955 a young Irish Catholic,Michael Sheey,published a book entitled 'Divided We Stand' in which he argued that there were two distinct peoples on the island,that unionists had good reasons for not wishing to join with the south,and that there was no moral case for the ending of partition. In 1959 a young barrister (who has since become a distinguished judge),Donal Barrington,published a pamphlet on similar lines entitled 'Uniting Ireland'. Barrington challenged the central tenets of traditional nationalism:
'It is quite misleading to say that partition was forced on Ireland by the British Goverment against the wishes of North and South. It would be more correct to say that partition was forced on the British Goverment by the conflicting demands of the two parties on the island. It is true that both North and South were dissatisfied with partition but that was because the North wanted all Ireland for the Act of Union and the South wanted all Ireland for Home Rule. Both demands could not be met,neither party was prepared to give way and the inevitable result was partition. Barrington was a nationalist,in the sense that he desired a united Ireland. But he was an innovator in that he put the root of the opposition to unity,not in Britain,but among the Protestants of the north. This entailed switching the thrust of nationalist policy from trying to induce the British to leave Ireland and trying to induce Protestants to join in a united Ireland. Page 120

The events of the last twenty years have been illuminating for nationalists. They have made it far more difficult to argue that Protestant opposition to Irish unity is essentially artifical,blown up out of proportion by British machinations. Page 121

In the 1950s the BBC was following a policy of bringing both sides of society together. This meant that 'the positive aspects of community relations were emphasised and the negative underplayed' (Cathcart 1984,263) Page 123

A great weight of historical writing can,however, be put in the other side of the balance. On the whole,recent historians have been struck by the depth of Ulster unionist opposition to a united Ireland separate from Britain,and the independence of that opposition from British support. Page 125

F.S.L. Lyons in his magisterial biography of Parnell,criticizes Parnell for his failure to take seriously the problem posed by Ulster unionist opposition to home rule. Ruth Dudley Edwards,in her equally authoritive life of Patrick Pearse,considers him naive for believing that the Orangemen could be won over to the nationalist cause. Page 125

Akenson's 'Between Two Revolutions: Islandmagee,County Antrim. Islandmagee,an almost purely Protestant area,had in 1978 joined in the United Irish rebellion against English domination. By 1920,however,it was solidly in favour of the union with Britain. To examine the reasons for this change is to provide a kind of litmus test against which some theories of the growth of unionism - traditional nationalist,but also Marxist - can be tested. The change could not be ascribed to the creation of marginal differences for Protestants against Catholics - there were hardly any Catholics in the area to be discriminated against (Akenson 1979,162,176). It could not be ascribed to the influence of the Orange Order,which was weak in Islandmagee (pp.152-3). It could not be ascribed to the growing economic differentiation between the industrial north-east of Ireland and the argicultural society in the rest of the island,because Islandmagee itself remained overwhelmingly rural (p.177). The most plausible explanation of why the people of Islandmagee became such staunch defenders of the status quo,in Akenson's view,is that, under the union,and particularly from about 1850,their society had worked. In addition,their culture was predominantly Scottish (p.175). In these circumstances there was nothing for them in a united Ireland separate from Britain. 'The Islanders acted as loyalists simply as an assertion of their own cultural identity' (p.178) Page 126/7

Dr Laffan's says Partition was a solution,one of several possible solutions,to a problem which went back centuries the clash of interests between two 'nations' and two religions in Ireland (p.1) Page 130

O'Halloran's account shows that nationalists of all kinds were baffled by the same problems as taxed de Valera. None of them was prepared to abandon the central tenet of nationalism,that Ireland ought to be united. But none of them had any better idea than de Valera about how to reconcile this aim with the evident refusal of Ulster unionists to have anything to do with it. Some hoped for the economic development of the Irish Free State to such heights that the northerners would be glad to come in (O'Halloran 1987,44,159-63). Others comforted themselves by arguing that the border was so unnatural that unity was inevitable (pp. 158-59). Some argued that the unionists.despite their protestations were really Irish and not British,and could be brought to accept their true nationality as they had done in the eigtheenth century (pp.36-41). A few even saw the study of Irish culture and the Irish language as a common interest which could act as a bridge to unity(pp.170-5)

Authors who have explored the nineteenth century have found that the roots of the unionist tradition are older and sturdier than nationalists were traditionally disposed to admit. Scholars who have investigated the nationalist attitude to N.I. since partition have been struck by the internal inconsistencies of the position - insisting that Ireland was really one nation,yet unable to find any convincing way of reconciling that claim with the refusual of unionists to accept that they belonged to that nation. These findings are all the more significant because the majority of the authors who have developed them come from the nationalist tradition. Page 133

Both strands of Adam's(Gerry) case are open to question. The claim that the unionists are an Irish minority,without the right of self-determination,is to assume what needs to be proved. We have seen that nothern Protestants are much more likely to describe themselves as 'British'or'Ulster' than Irish. We have seen earlier in this chapter that nearly all historians who have looked at Ulster during the union period have been struck by the strength and durability of the distinct Protestant identity.

More important have been the real differences in religious values,national identity,and economic interest. Page 135.

Desmond Fennell is the author of four revelant books. On his own showing ,he worked in the 1970s with Provisional Sinn Fein and wrote for the republican organ An Phoblacht. At the same time however,he rejects some traditional beliefs. He does not believe that the people of Ireland comprise one nation. In Ireland,'there is one nation,the Irish nation,and part of another nation,namely the British nation. He is critical of those nationalists who see the Ulster unionists as 'somehow,unknown to themselves,as part of the Irish nation' Page 137

The traditional nationalist interpretation,in the form in which it was expressed by writers such as Gallagher or statesmen such as de Valera,is now rarely found in the literature on Northern Ireland. Scarcely anyone who has put himself/herself to the discipline of writing in a scholarly manner on the problem now stands over the one-nation theory Page 141

British economic aid to N.I. was by the mid 1980's calculated as amounting to around one-third of public expenditure in the region. True,there are some ground for disagreement about this figure;the Ulster-born economist Tom Wilson suggests that on certain assumptions it might be significantly reduced. But even if a lower figure is accepted the degree of aid is still massive,and but for it everyone in Northern Ireland,Catholic as well as Protestant would be much worse off.

The weight of recent writing,then,does not sustain the traditional nationalist view that the current conflict is primarily between Britain and Ireland. To make the point clearer,a parallel might be drawn with the Israeli-Arab conflict. Israel recieves massive aid from the United States,and American foreign policy is clearly tilted in favour of Israel. But it does not mean that the United States is the primary cause of the conflict. Indeed,it could be argured that a withdrawal of American interest in the area might strengthen the most intransigent elements in Israel and actually make the situation worse. For the same sorts of reasons,it is possible to combine a critical attitude towards British policy in Northern Ireland with a recognition that the root problem cannot be defined as the British presence. Indeed it is possible to argue that,with all its faults,the British presence prevents worse from happening in N.I. Pages 144/45

The unionist view of N.I.,like the nationalist,can be traced back to the earliest days of the region itself. One of the first,and still among the best,statements of the case can be found in Ronald McNeill's Ulster's Stand for Union (1922). Hugh Shearman wrote two books in the 1940s: Not an Inch: A Study of N.I. and Lord Craigavon (1942) and Anglo-Irish Relations (1948). William A. Carson published a short book,scarecely more than a pamphlet,called Ulster and the Irish Republic,in 1957. The most comprehensive presentation of a pro-unionist point of view was published by a Dutch academic geographer,M.W. Heslinga,in his book The Irish Border as a Cultural Divide (1962). It is interesting that the fullest statement of the Ulster unionist case should come from a foreigner. Some might say that this illustrates the inarticulateness which unionists have always displayed,as compared with their nationalist counterparts. However that may be,it is probably true Heslinga's work can be taken as the best counterpart to Frank Gallagher's The Indivisible Island (1957). Between them,the two books illustrate the nationalist/unionist argument as it stood before the troubles began.

Heslinga argues that,despite the political secession of the greater part of Ireland in 1921,the British Isles remain in many ways one unit. Basing his conclusions partly on his own observation,and partly on an exhaustive study of the secondary literature available at the time he wrote,he argues that,in so far as there are differences between various parts of the archipelago,they are between north and south rather than between west and east,and that the Republic is in temperament and culture closer to England than to N.I. (pp.96-7). Though he accepts that there are similarities between north and south in Ireland,there are also many differences. The great difference between most of Ireland and the rest of the archipelago is religion (p.204): it does indeed divide most of Ireland from Britain,but also south from north within Ireland. Heslinga sees Ulstermen as forming a separate nation (p.62). While he does not feel obliged to stand over the details of the border he considers that it 'represents,however arbitrarily,an important spiritual divide'(p.78). Heslinga does not come to any overt political conclusions,which he may have felt were inappropiate in what was in origin an academic thesis,but it is clear that in the argument between traditional nationalists and traditional unionists his sympathies are with the latter. To him,the partition of Ireland is that natural consequence of deep-seated differences,and he sees no merit in the claim that Ireland should be one State.

There was one other demographic pressure on Protestants in the Republic. All sources agree tha this has caused a great deal of bitterness (Viney 1965,23-9:) White 1975,129-34;Bowen 1983,45-6,168-9;McLoone 1985,31;Galliher and DeGregory 1985,72-3). White(1975,129) explains the reasons:

There is no single cause that contributes so much to the embitterment of inter-faith relations as the rule of the Roman Catholic Church concerning mixed marriages. In any circle of Protestants,of any age-group,in any part of the country,this is the first reason that will be advanced to justify segregation in education and in social activities. Protestant parents do not want their children to mix with Catholics because they may marry Catholics; and if they marry Catholics,then the church will insist on an undertaking that the children of the marriage shall be brought up Catholics....As Protestants see it,their children are being placed in a situation of emotional blackmail,in which the price of love is the sacrifice of their own convictions.

In recent years the Catholc church's regulations have softened,and in any case a higher proportion of Catholic spouses now appear ready to ignore their Church's requirements (Bowen 1983,44-5). But these are recent developments,and it is uncertain how far they have gone. In the past,when a Protestant married a Catholic,he or she could usually be sure that the children would be brought up Catholics. This meant an unquantifiable but significant demographic loss to the Protestant community. Page 154

In the earlier period,the State (Eire) enacted laws enshrining Catholic values on contraception,divorce,and censorship. On divorce,Keogh (1986,128) has discovered from the archives that episcopal opposition went even further than appeared from the public record. Archbishop Byrne of Dublin informed the goverment in 1923 that 'the Church...could not even santion divorce for non-catholics for the reason that all persons who had been baptised are members of the Church and under its jurisdiction'. Successive goverments paid homage to the pope,or proclaimed Ireland to be a 'Catholic nation' (Whyte 1980,48,158). The fundamental rights clauses of the 1937 Constitution were based on Catholic social teaching,and, while the final decision about their phrasing were de Valera's,it is now known that they were framed only after extensive consultation with Catholic churchmen (Keogh 1987;Faughnan 1988). By 1949 one veteran Protestant nationalist Thomas Johnson,could write to another,Ernest Blythe,saying that the revival of militant Catholiciam gave credibity to the unionist fear that home rule would mean Rome rule - a fear that he would have once rejected. Page 155

In the following years,however,a number of measures which enshrined specifically Roman Catholic values were modified or repealed. The Censorship Board, once noted for its frequent banning of books which seemed incompatible with a conservative Catholic morality,was reformed in stages. In the 1980s,however,the pace of change faltered. Two referenda were held which had the effect of enshring,or maintaining,traditional Catholic values in the Constitution. 'Those who supported change were unrepresentative of a considerable section of Irish society' (Girvin 1987,97)

'A majority of Southerners are quite happy with the status quo. Their desire to maintain the ''Irish way of life'' is simply a euphemism for a society and a State which happily embraces Catholic traditions and reflects Catholic moral values' (Hogan 1987,94) Page 156

The Catholic bishops, on the other hand, have defended the existing situation. In their submission to the New Ireland Forum (Irish Episcopal Conference 1984,18-19) they argued that Catholic influence in a country like Ireland was natural.....

Every legal system thoughout the world bears the traces of majority opinion and of the public ethos and the majority consensus.........A Catholic country or its goverment,where there is a very substantial ethos and consensus, should not feel it necessary to apologise that its legal system,constitutional or statutory,reflects Catholic values....The rights of a minority are not more sacred than the rights of the majority. Page 157

Me either Slappa, and theres a few more would say the same I would think.

That United Loyalists site has closed as well.

Eire..Nationalty/Discrimination.
At the foundation of the State,most Protestants were unionist and found it difficult to identify with the new entity. All authorities agree that this has changed,and that most southern Protestants see themselves as unhyphenated Irish,without hankerings after the British connection. On the other hand there is evidence that notwithstanding the decades that have passed since independence,Protestants still do not see the State as theirs in quite the same way as Catholics. Protestants are still much under-represented in the public service. As White has noted(1975,162): 'not many Protestants thought of making a career in the Irish civil service. No doubt some were deterred by the need to qualify in Irish,but this may have been less a real obstacle than a symbol of a service in which they expected,instinctively,to feel out of place,'

A researcher who has worked for the Fair Employment Agency in Northern Ireland notes that 'if the North's fair employment legislation applied to the South,then the FEA could on,the statistical evidence,seek a major investigation of public sector employment'(Osborne 1983,14)

Eire ...Economics
The present situation of N.I. is so catastropic that it is beyond the power of the Republic to give financial aid on the scale required - all the more so in view of the Republic's own economic difficulties. The point has been well illustrated from an unexpected source. The New Ireland Forum commissioned a study on the economic consquences of Irish unity,prepared by an economic consultancy firm, Davy Kelleher McCarthy Ltd (New Ireland Forum 1984b). The study was deeply pessimistic about the effects of uniting Ireland in the absence of subvention from Britain or elsewhere. Its findings were summarized in a foreward by two distinguished economists, Norman Gibson and Dermot McAleese:

'A total and precipitate absence of such transfers in our view requires what can only be described as catastrophic economic adjustments. The disappearance and non-replacement of the British subvention would result,as already indicated,in an immediate loss of income equivalent to about 8 per cent of the GDP of the combined economies. The net result could as a first round effect be a fall in disposable income of around IR£2,000 million. Losses on a similar large scale would be expected to persist for many years and unemployment would increase substantially in both economies. Any attempt to offset these effects though foreign borrowing would be doomed to failure. Further accretions of foreign debt to an already high stock of borrowing would exacerbate the problem of high taxation and would soon become unsustainable. In such circumstances,it is doubtful if foreigners would be prepared to lend even if the authorities were willing to borrow. (pp,12-130)

Right Slappa. Thanks for the info. I'll have a look-see. Just wondering will you be in Belfast for the parade on Saturday. Its in the morning so might be a bit difficult to get to if you don't live in the area. Its an O.O. parade.

didnt even get to scotland for the SDl demo yesterday ffs